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Abstract
For survival and development, autonomous agents in complex adaptive systems involving the human society must
compete against or collaborate with others for sharing limited resources or wealth, by using different methods. One method
is to invest, in order to obtain payoffs with risk. It is a common belief that investments with a positive risk-return relationship
(namely, high risk high return and vice versa) are dominant over those with a negative risk-return relationship (i.e., high risk
low return and vice versa) in the human society; the belief has a notable impact on daily investing activities of investors.
Here we investigate the risk-return relationship in a model complex adaptive system, in order to study the effect of both
market efficiency and closeness that exist in the human society and play an important role in helping to establish traditional
finance/economics theories. We conduct a series of computer-aided human experiments, and also perform agent-based
simulations and theoretical analysis to confirm the experimental observations and reveal the underlying mechanism. We
report that investments with a negative risk-return relationship have dominance over those with a positive risk-return
relationship instead in such a complex adaptive systems. We formulate the dynamical process for the system’s evolution,
which helps to discover the different role of identical and heterogeneous preferences. This work might be valuable not only
to complexity science, but also to finance and economics, to management and social science, and to physics.
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Introduction
One can see most of the social, ecological, and biological
systems that contain a large number of interacting autonomous
agents as complex adaptive systems (CASs), because the agents
have adaptive capacities to the changing environment [1]. CAS
dynamics have attracted much attention among physical scientists
[2–6]. For survival and development, such agents in various kinds
of CASs involving the human society must compete against or
collaborate with each other for sharing limited resources or wealth,
by utilizing different methods. One method is to invest, in order to
obtain payoffs with risk. Accordingly, understanding the risk-
return relationship (RRR) has not only an academic value but also
a practical importance. So far this relationship has a two-fold
character. On one hand, one considers investments as high risk
high return and vice versa; the RRR is positive (risk-return
tradeoff) [7,8]. This is also an outcome of the traditional financial
theory under the efficient market hypothesis. On the other hand,
one also finds that some investments are high risk low return and
vice versa; the RRR is negative (Bowman’s paradox) [9,10].
However, almost all investment products take ‘‘high risk high
return’’ as a bright spot to attract investors, and neglect the
possible existence of ‘‘high risk low return’’. This actually results
from a received belief that investments with a positive RRR are
dominant over those with a negative RRR in the human society;
the belief directs investors to operate daily investing activities
including gambling [11]. Here we investigate the RRR by
designing and investigating a model CAS which includes the
following two crucial factors:
– Market efficiency. The present system exhibits market efficiency at
which it reaches a statistical equilibrium [5,6]. We shall address
more relevant details at the end of the next section.
– Closeness. The system involves two conservations: one is the
conservation of the population of investors (Conservation I), the
other is the conservation of wealth (Conservation II).
Regarding Conservation I/II, it means that we fix the total
number/amount of the subjects/wealth in the system.
Clearly the two factors have real traces in the human society.
Accordingly they have played an important role in helping to
establish traditional finance/economics theories. The present
designing system just allows us to investigate the joint effect of
the two factors on the RRR.
Results
Human Experiment
On the basis of the CAS, we conduct a series of computer-aided
human experiments. (These experiments are essentially online
games, thus ethics approval was not necessary. In the mean time,
we obtained verbal consent from all the subjects.) Details: there are
two virtual rooms, Room 1 and Room 2 (represented by two
buttons on the computer screen of the subjects), for subjects to
invest in. The two rooms have volumes, M1 and M2, which may
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world. In the experiments, we recruited 24 students from Fudan
University as subjects. The subjects acted as fund managers, who
were responsible for implementing a fund’s investing strategy and
managing its trading activities. We told the subjects the
requirement of total 30 rounds for each M1=M2, and offered
every subject 1000 points (the amount of virtual money constructs
the fund managed by the subject) as his/her initial wealth for each
M1=M2. In an attempt to make the subjects maximize their
pursuit of self-interest, we promised to pay the subjects Chinese
Yuan according to the fixed exchange rate, 100:1 (namely, one
hundred points equal to one Chinese Yuan), at the end of the
experiments, to offer every subject 30 Chinese Yuan as a bonus of
attendance, and to give extra 50 Chinese Yuan to the subject who
gets the highest score for one M1=M2. At the beginning of the 1st
round of each M1=M2, we told the 24 subjects the actual ratio of
M1=M2, and asked each subject to decide his/her investing weight
[signed as x(i) for Subject i]. Note the investing weight, x(i), is the
percentage of his/her investing wealth (investment capital) with
respect to his/her total wealth, and it will keep fixed within the 30
rounds for a certain M1=M2. At every round, each subject can
only independently invest in one of the two rooms. After all the
subjects made their own decisions, with the help of the computer
program, we immediately knew the total investments in each room
(signed as W1 and W2 for Room 1 and Room 2, respectively) at
this round. While keeping the total wealth conserved, we
redistributed the total investment W1zW2 according to the
following two rules:
(1) We divided the total investment, W1zW2, by the ratio of
M1=M2, yielding (W1zW2)
M1
M1zM2
and (W1zW2)
M2
M1zM2
as the payoff for Room 1 and Room 2, respectively.
(2) We redistributed the payoff of Room k (k~1or2) by the
investment of the subjects. Namely, for each round, the payoff
for Subject i choosing Room k to invest in, wpayoff(i),i s
determined by wpayoff(i)~(W1zW2)
Mk
M1zM2
|
win(i)
Wk
,
where win(i) is the investing wealth of Subject i,
win(i)~x(i)w(i). Here w(i) is the total wealth possessed by
Subject i at the end of the previous round.
Before the experiments, we told the subjects the above two rules
for wealth re-allocation. After each round, every subject knows
his/her payoff, wpayoff(i). If there is wpayoff(i)wwin(i), that is,
Subject i gets more than the amount he/she has invested, we
consider Subject i as a winner at this round. Equivalently, if
W1
M1
v
W2
M2
, the subjects choosing Room 1 to invest in win at this
round. Clearly, when
W1
W2
~
M1
M2
, every subject obtains the payoff
which equals to his/her investing wealth. Namely, the arbitrage
opportunity has been used up. Accordingly, we define the
Figure 1. Averaged ratio, SW1=W2T, versus M1=M2 for the
human experiments with 24 subjects (red squares) and agent-
based computer simulations with 1000 agents (blue dots). Here
‘‘S   T’’ denotes the average over the total 30 experimental rounds
(experimental data of W1=W2 for each round are shown in Table 1) or
over the 800 simulation rounds (the additional 200 rounds were
performed at the beginning of the simulation for each M1/M2; during
the 200 rounds, we train all of the strategies by scoring them whereas
the wealth of each agent remains unchanged). All the experimental and
simulation points lie in or beside the diagonal line (‘‘slope=1’’), which is
indicative of SW1=W2T&M1=M2. Parameters for the simulations: S~4
and P~16.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033588.g001
Table 1. Experimental data of W1=W2’s for six M1=M2’s
within 30 rounds.
Round
M1=M2
~1
M1=M2
~2
M1=M2
~3
M1=M2
~6
M1=M2
~7
M1=M2
~9
1 1.247723 1.143654 5.267782 2.98977 24.41429 2.146853
2 0.582237 0.702725 1.717598 11.02642 6.827457 4.860541
3 0.759914 1.897306 2.43237 10.32266 11.25343 11.30546
4 1.903253 1.240914 2.699907 2.97036 5.688661 9.681926
5 1.940527 1.564242 3.999681 3.977399 6.546176 5.249869
6 1.4852 4.711605 2.815152 6.900399 5.13295 6.16301
7 0.71966 2.087147 8.280381 2.991117 9.27272 7.25918
8 0.675138 1.692307 4.590899 3.35285 7.12301 8.996662
9 1.029128 2.73341 1.833477 4.363129 4.329496 7.133701
10 0.867554 2.095702 3.063358 7.273544 8.198398 14.26918
11 1.50125 1.305197 3.862686 18.23372 5.927536 5.500789
12 0.846259 2.292878 3.826587 8.50234 4.673143 5.141253
13 0.629585 1.992493 5.31337 4.613084 13.47519 34.4646
14 0.784858 2.462247 4.687499 19.73941 4.867279 3.889573
15 1.484235 1.807911 2.991726 3.40541 9.820732 7.442826
16 2.309969 1.544355 3.301258 4.864645 19.63957 15.74645
17 1.01251 2.078769 1.009523 8.219743 4.389477 11.55617
18 0.987891 2.624829 1.531467 2.935522 6.684373 8.712361
19 1.319123 2.25104 2.29988 3.813827 6.655679 6.623739
20 0.872338 2.045779 3.140856 5.690231 9.253236 7.973963
21 1.166773 2.006077 5.282071 5.889009 5.021116 5.825073
22 0.896165 1.419159 3.53215 6.137386 7.409623 8.32772
23 0.872224 2.141954 2.629218 11.09127 7.033376 15.57089
24 1.275063 1.990766 4.722947 5.989491 7.216511 10.87512
25 0.695696 2.151347 3.410795 7.790409 8.787551 4.759215
26 1.149307 2.150258 3.400615 8.213546 6.472158 13.14246
27 1.379602 1.621164 5.898509 5.078065 6.915495 7.992252
28 0.809361 1.62651 2.421057 3.698009 5.514453 11.76899
29 0.772988 1.670855 3.576442 7.848631 7.483899 16.27463
30 0.367173 2.010509 2.90843 11.10609 8.9996 4.854004
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033588.t001
Risk-Return Relationship
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state as an equilibrium (or balanced) state [12]. This
state may have some practical significance because global
arbitrage opportunities for investing in the human society always
tend to shrink or even disappear once known and used by more
and more investors. As shown in Figure 1 (as well as Table 1), our
experimental system can indeed achieve SW1=W2T&M1=M2 at
which the system automatically produces the balanced allocation
of investing wealth; this system thus reaches a statistical
equilibrium. In other words, the ‘‘Invisible Hand’’ plays a full
role [6], or alternatively the system exhibits market efficiency.
That is, all subjects are pursuing self-interest and we run the
present system under three conditions: with sufficient information
(namely, the wealth change for each round has reflected the
possible information), with free competition (i.e., no subjects
dominate the system and there are zero transaction costs), and
without externalities (the wealth change of a subject has reflected
the influence of his/her behavior on the others).
If a subject (namely, a fund manager) chooses a larger investing
weight, he/she will invest more virtual money in a room.
According to the rules of our experiment, the room he/she
chooses will then be more likely to be the losing one. Besides, the
initial wealth is the same for every subject and he/she knows
nothing but himself/herself. From this point of view, the larger
investing weight he/she chooses, the higher risk (or uncertainty)
he/she will take for the fund (i.e., the initial 1000 points).
Therefore, throughout this work, we simply set the investing
weight, x(i), to equal the risk he/she is willing to take. Here we
should remark that the present definition of risk appears to be
different from that in finance theory. For the latter, one often
defines risk according to variance. Nevertheless, the two kinds of
risk are essentially the same because they both describe the
uncertainty of funds and have a positive association with each
other. On the other hand, we should mention that the risk we
define for each subject does not change with the evolution of the
time. This is a simplification which makes it possible to discuss the
pure effect of a fixed value of ‘‘risk’’. Nevertheless, if we choose to
Figure 2. Relationship between the risk, x(i), and the return, rT(i)~½wT(i){w0(i) =w0(i), for (a)–(f) 24 subjects and (g)–(l) 1000 agents at
various M1=M2’s. (a)–(f) Data of the human experiments (total 30 rounds for each M1=M2); (g)–(l) Data of the agent-based computer simulations
(total 800 rounds for each M1=M2, with additional 200 rounds performed at the beginning of the simulations; during the 200 rounds, we train all of
the strategies by scoring them whereas the wealth of each agent remains unchanged). Here wT(i) is Agent i’s wealth at the end of T rounds (the total
number of rounds, T,i sT~30and800 for the experiments and simulations, respectively), and w0(i) is Agent i’s initial wealth. All of the subjects or
agents are divided into two groups with preferencev1 (red squares) and preference=1 (blue dots). Here, the ‘‘preference’’ is given by C1=T, where
C1 is the number of times for subjects or agents to choose Room 1 within the total T rounds. The values or distribution of the preferences of the
subjects or agents can be found in Figs. 4 and 5. Here, ‘‘Linear Fit’’ denotes the line fitting the data in each panel using the least square method,
which serves as a guide for the eye. (The fitting functions are listed in Table 2.) All of the lines are downward, which indicate a statistically negative
relationship between risk and return. The present negative relationship just reflects the dominance of investments with a negative RRR in the whole
system, in spite of a relatively small number of investments with a positive RRR. Other parameters: (g)–(l) S~4 and P~16.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033588.g002
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take an average of the ‘‘risk’’ over the full range of time.
Figure 2(a)–(f) displays the risk-return relationship for the
investments in the designing CAS. From statistical point of view,
we find that investments with a negative RRR are dominant over
those with a positive RRR in the whole system.
An Agent-Based Model
Clearly the human experiments have some unavoidable
limitations: specific time, specific avenue (a computer room of
Fudan University), specific subjects (students from Fudan Univer-
sity), and the limited number of subjects. Now we are obliged to
extend the experimental results [Figure 2(a)–(f)] beyond such
limitations. For this purpose, we resort to an agent-based model
[12–14].
Similar to the above experiments, we set two virtual rooms,
Room 1 and Room 2 (with volume M1 and M2, respectively), for
N agents (fund managers) to invest in. Then, for each M1=M2,
assign every agent 1000 points as his/her initial wealth and an
investing weight, x(i), which is randomly picked up between 0 and
1 with a step size of 0.001. In order to avoid the crowding or
overlapping of strategies of different agents [15–17], we design the
decision-making process for each agent with four steps.
– Step 1: set a positive integer, P, to represent the various
situations for investing [5,6].
– Step 2: assign each agent S strategies according to S integers
between 0 and P, respectively. For example, if one of the S
integers is L, then the corresponding strategy of the agent is
given by the ratio L=P (0ƒL=Pƒ1), which represents the
probability for the agent to choose Room 1 to invest in [5].
Figure 3. Same as Figure 2(g)–(l), but showing the relationship between the risk, x(i), and the relative wealth, wT(i)=w0(i),o na
logarithmic scale. ‘‘Linear Fit’’ corresponds to the line fitting the data of preferencev1 or preference~1 using the least square method, which
serves as a guide for the eye. (The fitting functions are listed in Table 3.)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033588.g003
Table 2. Linear fitting functions for Figure 2.
M1=M2 For the experimental data [Fig. 2(a)–(f)] For the simulation data [Fig. 2(g)–(l)]
1 rT(i)~0:17{0:31x(i) [Fig. 2(a)] rT(i)~0:40{0:82x(i) [Fig. 2(g)]
2 rT(i)~0:0073{0:036x(i) [Fig. 2(b)] rT(i)~0:53{1:08x(i) [Fig. 2(h)]
3 rT(i)~0:49{0:74x(i) [Fig. 2(c)] rT(i)~0:37{0:76x(i) [Fig. 2(i)]
6 rT(i)~0:31{0:41x(i) [Fig. 2(d)] rT(i)~0:44{0:89x(i) [Fig. 2(j)]
7 rT(i)~0:24{0:29x(i) [Fig. 2(e)] rT(i)~0:35{0:68x(i) [Fig. 2(k)]
9 rT(i)~0:26{0:33x(i) [Fig. 2(f)] rT(i)~0:20{0:38x(i) [Fig. 2(l)]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033588.t002
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initial score, 0, and is added one score (or zero score) if the
strategy predicts (or does not predict) the winning room
correctly after each round.
– Step 4: every agent chooses either Room 1 or Room 2 to invest
in according to the prediction made by the strategy with the
highest score.
Figure 4. Preferences of (a)–(f) the 24 subjects in the human experiments (plotted in the bar graph) or (g)–(l) the 1000 agents in the
agent-based computer simulations, for various M1=M2’s. Here, ‘‘Mean’’ denotes the preference value averaged for (a)–(f) the 24 subjects or
(g)–(l) 1000 agents. In (a)–(f), the present 24 subjects are ranked by their risk (namely, their investing weight) from low to high, within the range (a)
[0.16, 1], (b) [0.01, 1], (c) [0.02, 1], (d) [0.16, 1], (e) [0.31, 1], and (f) [0.29, 1]; see Table 4 for details. Similarly, in (g)–(l), the 1000 agents are ranked by
their risk from low to high, within the range (0, 1] assigned according to the code ‘‘(double)rand()%1001=1000’’ in the C programming language. In
(a)–(f), the ratio between the numbers of subjects with ‘‘preference=1’’ and ‘‘preferencev1’’ are, respectively, (a) 2/22, (b) 4/20, (c) 5/19, (d) 7/17, (e)
11/13, and (f) 8/16. In (g)–(l), the ratio between the numbers of agents with ‘‘preference=1’’ and ‘‘preferencev1’’ are, respectively, (g) 2/998, (h) 23/
977, (i) 94/906, (j) 233/767, (k) 200/800, and (l) 220/780.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033588.g004
Table 3. Linear fitting functions for Figure 3.
M1=M2 For‘‘preferencev1’’ For‘‘preference~1’’
1 log10 (wT(i)=w0(i))~0:10{0:31x(i) [Fig. 3(a)] log10 (wT(i)=w0(i))~0:05z0:058x(i) [Fig. 3(a)]
2 log10 (wT(i)=w0(i))~0:07{0:23x(i) [Fig. 3(b)] log10 (wT(i)=w0(i))~0:02z0:24x(i) [Fig. 3(b)]
3 log10 (wT(i)=w0(i))~0:09{0:28x(i) [Fig. 3(c)] log10 (wT(i)=w0(i))~0:01z0:05x(i) [Fig. 3(c)]
6 log10 (wT(i)=w0(i))~0:09{0:37x(i) [Fig. 3(d)] log10 (wT(i)=w0(i))~0:01z0:19x(i) [Fig. 3(d)]
7 log10 (wT(i)=w0(i))~0:10{0:42x(i) [Fig. 3(e)] log10 (wT(i)=w0(i))~0:003z0:29x(i) [Fig. 3(e)]
9 log10 (wT(i)=w0(i))~0:11{0:68x(i) [Fig. 3(f)] log10 (wT(i)=w0(i))~0:004z0:48x(i) [Fig. 3(f)]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033588.t003
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distributing investing wealth in Room 1 and Room 2 are set to be
the same as those already mentioned in the section of Human
Experiments.
Comparison between Experimental and Simulation
Results
As shown by Figure 1, our agent-based computer simulations
also give SW1=W2T&M1=M2, that is, the system under
simulation also exhibits market efficiency. Further, according to
the simulations, we achieve the same qualitative conclusion:
investments with a negative RRR are statistically dominant over
those with a positive RRR in the whole system; see Figure 2(g)–(l).
Nevertheless, when we scrutinize Figure 2(j)–(l), we find that some
particular data seem to be located on a smooth upward line. Then
we plot these data in blue, and further find that they are just
corresponding to all the agents with ‘‘preference=1’’. Encourag-
ing by this finding, we blue all the data of ‘‘preference=1’’ in the
other 9 panels of Figure 2, and observe that a similar upward line
also appears in the experimental results [see the blue dots in
Figure 2(a)–(f); note the blue dots in Figure 2(c) and (e) are also, on
average, in an upward line even though they appear to be not so
evident].
For the upward lines themselves, they are clearly indicative of
investments with a positive RRR. Hence, to distinctly understand
our main conclusion about the dominance of investments with a
negative RRR in the whole system, we have to overcome the
puzzle, namely, the strange appearance of these upward lines
(constructed by the blue dots in Figure 2). For convenience, we just
need to answer Question 1: why do all the ‘‘preference=1’’ data
dots of Figure 2(g)–(l) exist in an upward line? To this end, the
process to find the answer to Question 1 will also help to reveal the
mechanism underlying the above main conclusion.
Comparison among Experimental, Simulation, and
Theoretical Results
To answer Question 1, alternatively we attempt to study the
relationship between risk and wealth; see Figure 3. In Figure 3, the
‘‘preference=1’’ data dots appear to be arranged in an upward
straight line, and the straight line exactly corresponds to the
upward line constructed by the blue dots in Figure 2(g)–(l) due to
the relationship between the wealth and return. So, Question 1
equivalently becomes Question 2: why do all the ‘‘preference=1’’
data dots of Figure 3 exist in an upward straight line? To answer it,
we start by considering Agent i with investment weight, x(i). Then
his/her return and wealth after t rounds are, respectively, rt
0(i)
and wt(i). Here, the subscript te½0,T . (Note T stands for the total
number of simulation rounds, T~800.) Clearly, when t~0,
wt(i)~w0(i), which just denotes the initial wealth of Agent i.
Then, we obtain the expression for rt
0(i)~½wt(i){wt{1(i) =
½wt{1(i)x(i) . Accordingly, we have w1(i)~w0(i)½1zr1
0(i)
x(i)  and w2(i)~w1(i)½1zr2
0(i)x(i) ~w0(i)½1zr1
0(i)x(i) ½1z
r2
0(i)x(i) , thus yielding wT(i)~w0(i)½1zr1
0(i)x(i) ...½1z
rT
0(i)x(i) ~w0(i) P
T
t~1
½1zrt
0(i)x(i) . As a result, we obtain
Table 4. Values for the risk (namely, investing weight) of the 24 subjects for six M1=M2’s in the human experiments.
Subject M1=M2~1[Fig. 4(a)] 2[Fig. 4(b)] 3[Fig. 4(c)] 6[Fig. 4(d)] 7[Fig. 4(e)] 9[Fig. 4(f)]
1 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.31 0.29
2 0.21 0.02 0.2 0.2 0.46 0.31
3 0.29 0.11 0.21 0.41 0.47 0.39
4 0.31 0.2 0.4 0.46 0.49 0.4
5 0.36 0.26 0.41 0.49 0.52 0.47
6 0.42 0.41 0.45 0.5 0.7 0.57
7 0.42 0.48 0.46 0.61 0.75 0.7
8 0.42 0.5 0.46 0.7 0.75 0.7
9 0.46 0.5 0.48 0.7 0.79 0.71
10 0.47 0.52 0.5 0.74 0.86 0.74
11 0.48 0.57 0.63 0.76 1 0.79
12 0.5 0.6 0.72 0.8 1 0.9
13 0.5 0.64 0.74 0.8 1 1
14 0.55 0.74 0.89 0.82 1 1
15 0.56 0.81 0.91 0.86 1 1
16 0.61 1 1 0.86 1 1
1 7 0 . 6 1 11111
1 8 0 . 6 3 11111
1 9 0 . 6 6 11111
2 0 0 . 6 7 11111
2 1 0 . 7 2 11111
2 2 1 11111
2 3 1 11111
2 4 1 11111
We ranked the 24 subjects by their risk from low to high, as already used in Figure 4(a)–(f).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033588.t004
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wT(i)
w0(i)
~log10f P
T
t~1
½1zrt
0(i)x(i) g ~
X T
t~1
log10½1zrt
0(i)x(i) 
~
X T
t~1
rt
0(i)
"#
x(i)~TSrt
0(i)Tx(i). Here the third ‘‘=’’ holds due
to rT
0(i)x(i)?0 for the T simulation rounds of our interest. In
this equation, SrT
0(i)T denotes the average return, namely, the
value obtained by averaging rT
0(i) over the T rounds, and
wT(i)
w0(i)
represents the relative wealth. Thus, the relationship between
log10
wT(i)
w0(i)
and x(i) should be linear; the sign of the slope of the
straight lines is only dependent on the average return, SrT
0(i)T.
Because the agents with preference=1 always enter Room 1
with M1(wM2), the average return, SrT
0(i)T,f o rt h e mi sn o t
only positive but also the same. This is why all the blue points
in Figure 3 lie on an upward straight line. However, for the
other agents with preferencev1 (Figure 3), they will change
rooms from time to time, so their average return, SrT
0(i)T,i s
different from one another. This is the reason why the red
points do not form a straight line as the blue points do. From
this point of view, the downward straight line we draw for the
red points in Figure 3 is just a statistical analysis, showing a
trend. They do not actually form a straight line. So far, our
answer to Question 2 can simply be ‘‘because for the small
number of agents with preference=1, their average return,
SrT
0(i)T, is not only positive but also the same’’.
According to the above theoretical analysis, we can now
understand that the statistical dominance of investments with a
negative RRR in the whole system results from the distribution of
subjects’/agents’ preferences: the heterogeneous preferences(v1)
owned by a large number of subjects/agents together with the
identical preferences(~1) possessed by a small number of
subjects/agents. Details about the actual values for the preferences
can be found in Figs. 4–5. Figs. 4–5 also show the environmental
adaptability of subjects or agents.
Discussion
On the basis of the designed CAS (complex adaptive system), we
have revisited the relationship between risk and return under the
influence of market efficiency and closeness by conducting human
experiments, agent-based simulations, and theoretical analysis. We
have reported that investments with a negative RRR (risk-return
relationship) have dominance over those with a positive RRR in
this CAS. We have also revealed the underlying mechanism
related to the distribution of preferences. Our results obtained for
the overall system do not depend on the evolutionary time, T,a s
long as T is large enough. On the other hand, the experimental
data for each T have been listed in Table 1. Clearly, the results for
each T can change accordingly. In fact, such changes echo with
Figure 5. Same as Figure 4, but showing the distribution of preferences.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033588.g005
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investors in the real human society.
This work should be valuable not only to complexity science,
but also to finance and economics, to management and social
science, and to physics. In finance and economics, it may remind
investors about their daily investing activities. In management and
social science, our work is of value on clarifying the relationship
between risk and return under some conditions. In physics, the
present work reveals a new macroscopic equilibrium state in such
a CAS.
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